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Abstract—In this paper, we conduct agent-based simulation
experiments for network formation analysis. In the published
papers, Bala and Goyal (2000) have constructed a mathematical
model leading a star network to be strict Nash equilibrium.
However, Berninghaus et al. (2007) have conducted the laboratory
experiments using human subjects basing on the mathematical
model, and the result of the experiments indicates that human
subjects do not always make decision just as the mathematical
model predicted. In this paper, we propose a simulation model
using the adaptive artificial agents to clarify the reason of the
deviation from the mathematical predictions.
I. INTRODUCTION
In the network models, each decision maker such as individ-
ual, firm, or country in the real world is represented as player
and the network indicates the relation between the decision
makers. The network models are mathematically defined using
the graph model, such that player and a link formed between
a pair of players are represented by a node and an edge,
respectively. In recent years, a number of mathematical models
of network formation focusing on relation between the stability
and the efficiency of the networks are reported. In these
mathematical models, it is tried to explain some of social
phenomena, i.e., stock markets, labor market, and collective
actions [1], [2], [8].
Jackson and Wolinsky [8] constructed a mathematical model
of network formation such that a link between two players is
formed if both of them agree it. Jackson and Wolinsky showed
that the model leads the complete, the empty, and the star
network to be stable. In the complete network, there exists
a link between each pair of players whereas there exists no
link in the empty network. In the star network, particular one
player, called central player, forms link with all other players,
called peripheral players, and there exists no link between any
pair of peripheral players. Bala and Goyal [1] constructed two
mathematical models of network formation named “one-way
flow model” and “two-way flow model”. In both of the models,
it is assumed that a link is formed without agreement of both
corresponding players, in other words, a link is formed if
one player proposes formation of the link. And they indicated
that both mathematical models lead a wheel network to be
stable. They indicated that the one-way flow model, which
only the player who proposes the formation of a link receives
utility through the corresponding link, leads a wheel network
and the empty network to be stable. They showed that the
two-way flow model, which the two players corresponding
to one link receive utilities through the link, leads a center-
sponsored star network and the empty network to be stable.
Here, Bala and Goyal defined center-sponsored and periphery-
sponsored star networks. A center-sponsored network is one of
star networks such that all formed links are proposed by the
central player, and periphery-sponsored star network is one
of star networks such that each formed link between each
peripheral player and the central player is proposed by each
corresponding peripheral player. Additionally, Bala and Goyal
indicated that strict Nash equilibrium is stable.
Some studies of laboratory experiments using human sub-
jects to verify the above mentioned mathematical models of
network formation are reported. Callander and Plott [3] con-
ducted the laboratory experiments basing on the one-way flow
model which is proposed by Bala and Goyal [1], they show
that the human subjects formed wheel networks which are
predicted strict Nash equilibrium, and the networks are stable.
Falk and Kosfeld [5] conducted the laboratory experiments
using human subjects to verify the mathematical model of Bala
and Goyal. As the results of their experiments, in one-way flow
model, wheel networks are formed as stable networks as the
prediction of the mathematical model, however, in the two-
way flow model, no strict Nash equilibrium, center-sponsored
star network, is not formed. Berninghaus et al. [2] suggested a
little simpler mathematical model than that of Bala and Goyal.
The mathematical model by Berninghaus et al. supposed that
each player obtains payoff from other players forming a path
shorter than a particular length with him. The prediction of the
mathematical model is that a periphery-sponsored star network
is the strict Nash equilibrium. Additionally, Berninghaus et al.
examined the laboratory experiments using human subjects,
the subjects are divided into several groups. As the result of
the experiments, in some groups, though periphery-sponsored
star networks are formed, some of the subjects in each
group deviate from the equilibrium, through some changes of
the network structure, and again, a periphery-sponsored star
network is formed with central player different from the earlier
star network.
In this paper, we focus on the result of the laboratory
experiments of Berninghaus et al. [2], and by using an agent-
based simulation model, we indicate the reason of that the
human subjects deviate from the strict Nash equilibrium in the
experiments. As the result, one of the reasons is that human
can not always make decision to maximize their utility, but
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often make decision through trial and error. In this paper,
we employ a neural networks as the mechanism of decision
making and the genetic algorithms for learning mechanism of
the agents.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: In Section 2
we describe the mathematical model and the laboratory exper-
iments by Berninghaus et al. [2]. In Section 3, we construct an
agent-based simulation model for network formation analysis,
and in Section 4, we show and analyze the results of the
simulation experiments. Finally, we conclude in Section 5.
II. MATHEMATICAL MODELS AND LABORATORY
EXPERIMENTS OF NETWORK FORMATION
We describe the mathematical model and the laboratory
experiments by Berninghaus et al. [2].
A. Mathematical model of network formation
Let N = {1,2, ...,n} be a set of players and −→i j be a link
which is formed by a proposal of player i ∈ N and acceptance
of player j ∈ N, and i j represent −→i j or −→ji . Here, −→i j is called
an active link of player i and a passive link of player j. Let
L be a set of links, here, a network is defined as a set of all
players and a set of links, g = (N,L).
For a set of links Lc = {−→i j | ∀i, j ∈ N, i 6= j}, a network
gc = (N,Lc) is called a complete network, and gφ = (N,φ) is
called an empty network. A complete network and an empty
network with six players are shown in Fig. 1.
Fig. 1. A complete network and an empty network
For player i ∈ N and a set of links Ls = {i j | ∀ j ∈ N \{i}},
gs = (N,Ls) is called a star network. For player i and a set
of links Lw = {i2i1, . . . , inin−1, . . . , i1in}, gw = (N,Lw) is called
a wheel network. Especially, for player i and a set of links
Lsc = {−→i j | ∀ j ∈ N \{i}}, gsc = (N,Lsc), a network g = (N,Lsc)
is called a center-sponsored star network. For a set of links
Lsp = {−→ji | ∀ j∈N\{i}}, gsp =(N,Lsp), a network g=(N,Lsp) is
called a periphery-sponsored star network. A center-sponsored
star network and a periphery-sponsored star network are shown
in Fig. 2.
Fig. 2. Star networks
For player i∈N, a function Πi which associates a real value
for a network g= (N,L) is called a utility function. Let L−i =
{−→jk | −→jk ∈ L, j,k ∈ N, j 6= i} be a set of links which all links
which are formed by player i in network g=(N,L) are deleted.
The set of links L∗i is best response of player i for L∗−i if and
only if
Πi(g∗ = (N,L∗i ))≥Πi(g−i = (N,Li∪L∗−i)),∀i ∈ N (1)
holds. Here, let BRi(g−i) be the set of best responses of player
i for network g−i.
Definition A network g = (N,L) is a Nash equilibrium
network if gi ∈ BRi(g−i) for all i ∈ N, i.e., all players are
playing a Nash equilibrium in a Nash equilibrium network.
A strict Nash equilibrium network is one where each player
gets a strictly higher payoff with his current strategy than he
would with any other strategy.
Let P(i) be the number of passive links of player i, and we
focus on networks in which there is a unique player i∗ who
forms the largest number of active links in all players. In other
words, P(i∗)> P( j) holds.
Let d(g;gsp) a distance measure [2] of network g for a
periphery-sponsored star network. It indicates a constructive
distinction between a network g = (N,L) and a periphery-
sponsored star network gsp = (N,Lsp). d(g;gsp) is calculated as
following equation.
d(g;gsp) =

|P(i∗)−max j 6=i∗{P( j)}− (n−1)|
: if ∃i∗ and P(i∗)> n−12 ,
n−1 : otherwise.
(2)
If the difference between the maximum and the second
highest number of passive links is small, then it indicates that
a network g is far from a periphery-sponsored star network. If
(g;gsp) = 0, it indicates that the network g induces a periphery-
sponsored star network.
In a network g, let the neighbors of player i denote as
follows:
1) active neighbors of i:
Nai (g) = { j | −→i j ∈ L, j ∈ N, j 6= i}
2) passive neighbors of i:
N pi (g) = { j | −→ji ∈ L, j ∈ N, j 6= i}
3) indirect neighbors of i:
Nindi (g) = {k | −→i j ∈ L and jk ∈ L, j ∈ N, j 6= i}
Let Ni(g) denote the set of neighbors of player i.
Ni(g) := Nai (g)∪N pi (g)∪Nindi (g) (3)
Here, let |Ni(g)| and |Nai (g)| be the cardinality of Ni(g) and
Nai (g), respectively. All links are supposed to be symmetry for
all available link cost, and represented as c (> 0). The amount
of benefit which player i obtains from one of neighbors is
a (> 0). The player’s utility is represented as follows:
Πi(g) := a |Ni(g)|− c |Nai (g)| (4)
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Berninghaus et al. gave sufficient conditions for a periphery-
sponsored star for strict Nash equilibrium network.
Proposition 1 (Berninghaus et al.) If inequalities c <
(n− 1)a and n > 3 hold, a periphery-sponsored star network
is a strict Nash equilibrium network.
B. Laboratory experiments
Berninghaus et al. [2] conducted two kinds of laboratory ex-
periments using human subjects. These experiments are called
discrete time experiments and continuous time experiments, re-
spectively. In the discrete time experiments, the subjects make
decisions about network formation at each sequential periods.
However, in the continuous time experiments, they can change
their strategy at convenient moments for each subject. In both
kinds of experiments, the subjects select a strategy whether to
form, to delete a link between another subject, or do nothing.
They can form or delete a link unilaterally.
In discrete time experiments, the human subjects are divided
into ten groups and each group consists of six human subjects.
At each period, a human subject chooses other human subjects
whom he wants to form active link, and each human subject
makes decisions once, the network structure is modified. In
this network, human subjects obtain information about their
payoff a, link cost c, their current utilities and the current
network structure. The initial networks of all groups are the
complete networks, and let values of parameters be (a,c) =
(3,2). Then, at the first period, utility of each human subject
is 5.
In continuous time experiments, the human subjects are
divided into eight groups. They form or delete their links at
any time, and the human subjects receive the information of
networks five times per second. The current utility is computed
every fifth of a second and informed human subjects with
their information about their payoff, link cost and the current
network structure. Let the values of parameters of payoff and
link cost be (a,c) = (3,2). For example, if there are two
players and a link is formed between them, then the utility
per minute of player who forms an active link is a− c = 1
and the utility per minute of another player is a = 3. In the
laboratory experiments by Berninghaus et al., utility of each
human subject is accumulated over 30 min and paid out after
each experiment is finished.
The experimental results are summarized as follows: In
both kinds of experiments, in almost of groups periphery-
sponsored star networks are formed such as predicted by
the mathematical model of Bala and Goyal. In discrete time
experiments, some of the groups which form a strict Nash
equilibrium network deviate from it after some periods, and
the third, some groups deviate from the strict Nash equilibrium
network to form periphery-sponsored star networks with a
different central player in continuous time experiments. We
briefly summarize the characteristic features of experimental
results in the discrete time and in the continuous time by
Berninghaus et al. as follows.
Result of the experiments (discrete time) In 3 groups,
strict Nash equilibrium networks, periphery-sponsored star
networks, are formed. In two groups of the three groups in
which strict Nash equilibrium networks are formed, some of
the human subjects deviate from the strict Nash equilibrium
networks, and in one group, the human subjects does not
deviate from it.
Result of the experiments (continuous time) In 7 groups,
at least one strict Nash equilibrium network, periphery-
sponsored star network, is formed. In all groups except one
group in which strict Nash equilibrium networks are formed,
some of the human subjects deviate from the strict Nash
equilibrium networks and form the other periphery-sponsored
star networks with the different central players.
III. AGENT-BASED SIMULATION MODEL
In this paper, we propose a simulation model (A) corre-
sponds to the discrete time experiments by Berninghaus et al.
and a simulation model (B) corresponds to the continuous time
experiments. Multiple agents who are artificial and adaptive,
as alternatives to players, make decisions based on neural
networks composed of three layers, i.e., input layers, the
hidden layers and output layers [7]. Then, player i accept the
decision making of the agent which is selected with roulette
selection in agents Ai = {i1, i2, ..., im}, i= 1,2, ...,n correspond
to i. Therefore, player basically accept the decision making
of the agent which has the maximum value of the fitness,
while he accept the decision making of the other agent. Each
agent ik,k= 1,2, ...,m has the weights and thresholds of neural
networks as the gene information, and they learn the neural
networks by genetic algorithms [4], [6], [9].
The outline of simulation model is as follows:
Step 1 Generate a set of agents who have the
weights(w1,w2) and thresholds(θ1,θ2) of neural net-
work as the gene information for one player, and give
w1,w2,θ1,θ2 the real value in [−1,1] randomly.
Step 2 i = 1.
Step 3 Player i makes a decision based on the agents
correspond to i.
Step 4 Agent ik makes a decision based on neural net-
works.
Step 5 Apply genetic algorithms to gene, and repeat re-
production by roulette selection, one-point crossover,
mutation and elitist preserving selection until the
final generation.
Step 6 If i < n, then let i := i+ 1 and return to Step 3.
Otherwise, go to Step 7.
Step 7 Repeat from Step 2 to Step 6 prescribed times.
Let r be discount rate for the past payoffs of each player,
and g(t) be network at t-th period. Then the value of the fitness
of the agent ik at t-th period is calculated as follows by using
the payoffs which player i obtains during previous Pf terms.
Note that 1 term corresponds to t = n periods.
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Fig. 3. The outline of simulation model
fik(g(t)) =
Pf×n
∑
τ=0
rτ Πi(g(t +1− τ)), (5)
At one term, n players make decisions in the given random
set order, and m agents correspond to each player make deci-
sions based on the neural network shown in Fig. 4. After one
player makes decision, the network is modified, and players
repeat their decision-making T terms. The neural network used
by the agents and the gene information are shown in Fig. 4.
weights thresholds
(neural network) (neural network)
2
Fig. 4. Neural network used in simulation model and gene information
The information of the networks for past P periods as
follows is given to the input layers of neural network:
1) Number of active links of all players at the previous
period: |Nai (g(t))|i = 1,2, ...,n
2) Cumulative payoffs of all players for P periods as
frequency as n periods: ∑P−1p=0 Πi(g(t− p× n)) i =
1,2, ...,n
The output values from each node of the output layers
correspond to n players, if each output value is larger than
the threshold ϕ then the player form a link, and if not then
he delete a link. Each player makes a decision based on the
agent which corresponds to him and is selected with roulette
selection. The transfer function of the hidden layers and
the output layers of neural network be the sigmoid function
( f (x) = 11+e−x ).
In simulation models (A) and (B), players make decisions
based on neural network shown in Fig. 4. In the simulation
model (A) players make decisions at every periods in the
previous set order, while in the simulation model (B) one
player is selected from n players at every periods and he makes
a decision.
IV. RESULTS OF THE SIMULATION EXPERIMENTS
In this paper, the number of players is n = 6, and the
information values and link cost are (a,c) = (3,2) according
to the laboratory experiments by Berninghaus et al. [2]. The
values of rest parameters which are used in our simulation
experiments are shown in Table I.
We conduct the previous experiments about the number of
agents and the number of final generation, and we use the
parameters in Table I which shows the similar results to the
results of laboratory experiments by Berninghaus et al. in a
number of ways.
A. Result of the experiments in simulation model (A)
In the simulation model (A), the experiments are conducted
with 15 terms and 10 groups according to the laboratory
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TABLE I
THE VALUES OF PARAMETERS
simulation model (A) (B)
number of agents m = 10 m = 50
number of final generation fg = 5 fg = 30
discount rate for past payoff r = 0.99
crossover probability pc = 0.8
mutation probability pm = 0.01
generation gap G = 0.5
experiments of Berninghaus et al. [2]. In some groups in our
experiments, periphery-sponsored star networks are formed
as the laboratory experiments by Berninghaus et al. Here, a
periphery-sponsored star network is the strict Nash equilibrium
network. However, in our experiments, a part of players in
some of the groups deviate from the equilibrium. The results
of the simulation (A) are shown in Fig. 5.
Fig. 5. The distance measure for a periphery-sponsored star network in
simulation model (A)
From Fig. 5, the distance measure converges to 0 as
each experiment runs, it indicates that a periphery-sponsored
star network which is the strict Nash equilibrium network
is formed as the result of the laboratory experiments by
Berninghaus et al. Some players sometimes deviate from the
equilibrium, but the equilibrium is formed again.
B. Result of the experiments in simulation model (B)
In simulation model (B), the experiments are conducted with
10000 terms with 10 groups. Here, let P be the number of
periods which each agent obtains as the information of the
past network structures, and let Pf be the number of terms
which is applied for calculation of the fitness of the agents. As
described later, the values of P and Pf indicate that how many
periods the players use for decision making. In other words,
they indicate that how many indicators are applied to neural
networks. If the value of P and Pf are large, the players are
interpreted as that have long-term view for decision making.
We compare the simulation experiments with (P,Pf )= (1,1)
which is interpreted as the players have short-term view
for decision making and with (P,Pf ) = (10,10) which is
interpreted as the players have long-term view for decision
making. In Table II shows the number of groups where the
periphery-sponsored star networks with the number of the
central players have been formed in 10 groups.
The agents make decisions basing on the information of
networks for past P periods. From Table II, in some of the
groups, several kinds of periphery-sponsored star networks
which has different central players are formed, i.e., change of
the central players are observed in some groups. The players
accept the decision making of the agent which is selected
with roulette selection, therefore in the simulation result with
(P,Pf ) = (1,1) the central players probabilistically change, but
the variance of the number of the central players is small.
However the simulation result with (P,Pf ) = (10,10), the
variance of the number of the central players is large and
the number of the central players is uniform. Thus, long-term
information of past network structures leads change of the
central players.
A process of the change of the central players are shown in
Fig. 6.
Fig. 6. A process of network formation (example)
In Fig. 6, the black circles, the white circle and the arrows
indicate players, player making decision and links, respec-
tively. The numbers written near the circles show player’s
number and the current period is shown at the upper in Fig.
6. At t-th period, the strict Nash equilibrium network with
central player 3 is formed and the network formation transits
from t-th period to (t +8)-th period.
From Fig. 6, at (t+1)-th period, peripheral player 5 deviates
from the best response, i.e., delete a link with central player
3 and form a link with player 1 and 6. Then other peripheral
player 2 approve player 5 and form a link with player 1 at
(t + 2)-th period. Finally many players form links with one
player who is not a central player and the central player of
the strict Nash equilibrium changes from player 3 to player 1.
Thus, coordinative behavior among players leads a change of
the central player.
There exists some human subjects who deviate from the
strict Nash equilibrium network in the laboratory experiments
by Berninghaus et al. The result of our experiments indicates
two reasons of the deviation from the equilibrium of the
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TABLE II
NUMBER OF THE CENTRAL PLAYERS IN THE PERIPHERY-SPONSORED STAR NETWORKS IN SIMULATION MODEL (B)
Number of the central players Simulation result Experimental result(P,Pf ) = (1,1) (P,Pf ) = (10,10) by Berninghaus et al. [2]
0 0 0 1
1 3 2 1
2 0 2 2
3 5 1 2
4 2 3 1
5 0 1 0
6 0 1 1
Mean 2.6 3.2 2.6
Variance 1.38 2.84 3.41
human subjects. The first is that the decision making of human
subjects bases on trial and error mechanism. The second is
that the human subjects refer to the long-term information of
network structures and the other players’ utilities when they
make decisions.
V. CONCLUSION AND REMARKS
By the mathematical model of network formation by Bala
and Goyal [1], the strict Nash equilibrium is stable. How-
ever, in the laboratory experiments using human subjects by
Berninghaus et al. [2], after the formation of the strict Nash
equilibrium human subjects deviate from it, and that contradict
the result of the mathematical model.
In this paper, we provide that one of the reason of the
deviation from the strict Nash equilibrium in the laboratory
experiments using human subjects by simulation analysis
using artificial adaptive agents. It indicates that human have
the mechanism of decision making by trial and error and with
a long-term view.
Finally, we propose future works for this paper. To conduct
some kinds of simulation experiments of network formation
with other several conditions, for example the information
values and link cost are asymmetry for all players. A new
mathematical model which can explain the behavior of the
human subjects is one of the works.
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